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B A N K R U P T C Y
Does “Defalcation” by a Fiduciary, Rendering a Debt Nondischargeable,  
Include Unknowing Breaches of the Duty of Loyalty?
CASE AT A GLANCE 
Petitioner Randy Curtis Bullock, trustee of a family trust, loaned trust funds to himself, jointly with his 
mother, for business purposes. These loans were all repaid. A state court entered judgment against 
him for breach of fiduciary duty, ordering that profits from the loaned moneys be paid to the trust. The 
Supreme Court must decide whether Bullock’s liability for self-dealing, without conscious misbehavior, is 
nondischargeable as a “defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.”
Bullock v. BankChampaign, N.A.
Docket No. 11-1518
Argument Date: March 18, 2013
From: The Eleventh Circuit
by Marshall Tracht
New York Law School, New York, NY
ISSUE
Is a trustee’s liability for breach of the duty of loyalty through self-
dealing nondischargeable as “defalcation” under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)
(4) even if there is no showing of conscious misconduct and no loss 
to the trust? 
FACTS
In 1978, petitioner Randy Curtis Bullock’s father established a trust 
for the benefit of Bullock and his four siblings, appointing Bullock  
as the trustee. The sole asset in the trust was the father’s life insur-
ance policy, which had an accumulated cash value. In 1981, the  
father asked Bullock, who was at that point unaware that he had 
been appointed trustee, to loan $117,545.96 from the trust to his 
mother for use in the family garage-construction business. Two 
additional loans were made to Bullock and his mother together, 
each for business purposes, one in 1984 for approximately $200,000 
and another in 1990 for roughly $66,000. All loans were repaid with 
interest. 
In 1998, Bullock resigned as trustee at the request of some of the 
other beneficiaries, and BankChampaign, N.A., took over as trustee. 
In 1999, two of the beneficiaries sued Bullock in Illinois state court 
for breach of fiduciary duty. The state court held that although there 
had been no loss to the trust and Bullock did “not appear to have had 
a malicious motive in borrowing funds from the trust,” self-dealing 
by a trustee is a breach of the duty of loyalty and all profits derived 
from it had to be paid to the trust. The state court entered judgment 
for $250,000, as an estimate of the benefit realized by Bullock, plus 
$35,000 in attorney’s fees. 
In 2009, Bullock filed for bankruptcy; at this point, Bullock had not 
satisfied the judgment entered against him. BankChampaign, acting 
as trustee for the trust, filed an adversary proceeding asserting that 
the judgment in favor of the trust was nondischargeable under 11 
U.S.C. §523(a)(4). The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judg-
ment to BankChampaign based on the state court judgment, holding 
the debt nondischargeable. The district court and the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 
CASE ANALYSIS
Section 523 of the United States Bankruptcy Code provides: “(a) 
A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) 
of this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt 
… (4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, 
embezzlement, or larceny. …” 
“Defalcation” is an uncommon term, and courts have split widely on 
its meaning. The Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have taken a 
strict view, holding that defalcation includes even an innocent fail-
ure by the trustee to fully account for trust assets. The Fifth, Sixth, 
and Seventh Circuits have interpreted defalcation more narrowly, 
holding that it requires a showing of objectively reckless conduct. 
The First and Second Circuits have gone a step further, holding 
that defalcation requires extreme recklessness, meaning conscious 
misbehavior and wrongful intent. 
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh  
that defalcation requires a “known breach of a fiduciary duty, such 
that the conduct can be characterized as objectively reckless.” On 
the present facts, the Eleventh Circuit found this standard had  
been met: 
Because Bullock was the trustee of the trust, he certainly 
should have known that he was engaging in self-dealing, 
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given that he knowingly benefitted from the loans. Thus, 
his conduct can be characterized as objectively reckless, 
and as such, it rises to the level of a defalcation under  
§ 523(a)(4).
Bullock argues that the Supreme Court should hold that defalca-
tion requires extreme recklessness or conscious misconduct, the 
standard adopted by the First and Second Circuits. This standard, 
he argues, is required by the canon of construction noscitur a sociis: 
that the meaning of a word may be ascertained by examining the 
neighboring words with which it is associated. Section 523(a)(4) 
renders nondischargeable debts that result from “fraud or defalca-
tion while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement, or larceny.” 
Fraud (as used in § 523), embezzlement, and larceny all require 
intentional wrongdoing, so the natural reading according to Bullock 
is that defalcation, too, is intended to cover intentional wrongdoing. 
This argument, Bullock further asserts, is supported by rulings hold-
ing that exceptions to discharge should be construed narrowly in 
order to protect the “fresh start.” One of the primary goals of bank-
ruptcy is to relieve honest debtors from overwhelming indebtedness 
so they can start again free from the burdens of past misfortune. 
Discharge exceptions fall into two broad categories, Bullock argues: 
(1) specific categories of debt that should not be discharged for vari-
ous policy reasons, such as taxes, domestic support obligations, and 
educational loans; and (2) debts that are the product of wrongdoing, 
such as willful and malicious injury, fraud, or driving while intoxi-
cated. Holding that defalcation includes mere negligence or even 
recklessness would be inconsistent with this framework, concludes 
Bullock. 
As a second line of argument, Bullock maintains that defalcation 
requires the creditor to show that it has suffered a loss: defalcation 
“refers to a failure to produce funds entrusted to a fiduciary.” He 
was found liable for a breach of his duty of loyalty, but as he had 
already repaid the loans with interest, Bullock argues, the trust  
suffered no losses. The breach, therefore, did not amount to  
defalcation. 
Further, the bankruptcy court held the debt nondischargeable by  
relying on the state court determination that there had been a 
breach of fiduciary duty, even though the state court had found 
that there was no “malice” in his actions and no further evidence 
on mental state had been admitted in the bankruptcy case. Thus, 
Bullock argues, there is no factual basis on which the bankruptcy 
court could have held that any mental state beyond negligence had 
been shown. The Eleventh Circuit found that Bullock “should have 
known” the loans were improper and that he therefore met the 
“objective recklessness” standard, but Bullock argues that he should 
have the opportunity to introduce evidence of mental state rather 
than have it presumed on the basis of what he “should have known.”
In its response, BankChampaign essentially tries to finesse the 
question of the requisite mental state by focusing on the high stan-
dards to which fiduciaries are held and the fundamental importance 
of the duty of loyalty owed by a trustee to a trust and its beneficia-
ries. By “disregarding the high standards of loyalty that a trustee 
owes to a trust and beneficiaries, Bullock’s self-dealing was a defal-
cation regardless of the mental status that is implied by that term.” 
According to BankChampaign, even the toughest standard, “extreme 
recklessness,” has been met: “By knowingly and intentionally  
lending Trust assets for his personal benefit, Bullock’s acts departed 
extremely from the absolute duty of loyalty that the law demands  
of fiduciaries.” Outside of a fiduciary context, it argues, inten- 
tional wrongdoing or extreme recklessness may be required, but in 
a fiduciary context the breach of the duty of loyalty itself warrants 
nondischargeability, regardless of the trustee’s mental state. 
BankChampaign responds to Bullock’s claim that he did not know 
the loans were improper with the common maxim that “ignorance 
of the law is no excuse.” The Illinois state court had held that he 
breached the duty of loyalty through his self-dealing even though he 
acted without malice. “Defalcation,” BankChampaign argues, “is 
an objective standard regarding conduct, not a subjective standard 
relating to mental states.” 
In essence, BankChampaign is arguing that the breach of the duty 
of loyalty by self-dealing is enough to satisfy the wrongdoing  
element in § 523(a)(4), even if the trustee was unaware that he 
was breaching his duty. Bullock argues that liability under state law 
may exist on this basis (breach of loyalty, even if unintentional), 
but that the standards for nondischargeability under the Bankruptcy 
Code are higher than the standards for liability under state law.
As to the argument that there can be no defalcation where there 
was no loss to the trust, BankChampaign argues that there was a 
“failure to account” for trust assets by not reporting annually to 
the beneficiaries about the status of the trust, including the loans. 
Moreover, it argues that there was a loss in this case because the 
profits earned by Bullock from the improper loans were owed to the 
trust, but not paid to it. 
Finally, BankChampaign responds to Bullock’s arguments about 
the importance of the fresh start policy and narrow construction of 
discharge exceptions by noting that discharge is intended for the 
“honest but unfortunate debtor,” not to trustees who breach their 
fiduciary duties. Moreover, giving a narrow construction to defalca-
tion would promote the fresh start at the expense of the trust benefi-
ciaries, an outcome that Congress intended to prevent by providing 
that debts caused by defalcation cannot be discharged. 
SIGNIFICANCE
Family trusts are an important estate planning tool, and as this 
case shows, the complexity of family relationships and ignorance of 
some family trustees sometimes can make it difficult to adhere to 
fiduciary standards. This case will provide guidance on discharge-
ability in cases of misconduct. However, because the case involves 
the question of whether unintentional breaches are nondischarge-
able, it is unlikely to directly affect trustee behavior. The greater 
significance of this case is likely to come in other contexts. 
Although the issues are not raised in the briefs, the outcome in this 
case is likely to have an impact in a variety of situations far from the 
family trust setting. Suits against officers of a labor union, partners 
in a partnership, pension plan trustees, and mutual funds all can 
involve allegations of breach of fiduciary duty. Mortgage-backed 
securities are issued by trusts that hold the underlying notes and 
mortgages. Courts have split on whether the obligations of corporate 
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officers and directors are “fiduciary duties” within the meaning of  
§ 523(a)(4). Thus, the defalcation question can arise in a wide 
range of securities law and commercial settings apart from family 
trusts, and this case may therefore set the standard for when  
liability for corporate malfeasance is, or is not, dischargeable. 
Marshall Tracht is a bankruptcy scholar and director of the Real 
Estate LL.M. program at New York Law School. He can be reached  
at mtracht@nyls.edu or at 212.431.2139.
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